a.k.a. 4th Battalion the Sikh Regiment (XXXVI)
While I have been researching my father’s part in WWII, I often find myself falling down rabbit holes, rather like Alice in Wonderland –
And so it was that I had stumbled upon a Thread on the WW2Talk website entitled The Essex Regiment 1929-1950 History and, after a short while, I came across some pages that had been attached to Post #106 being an “Extract from Saragarhi Battalion: Ashes to Glory by Col Kanwaljit Singh, Maj H S Ahluwalia (pp. 102-111)”
How lucky was that. And it turns out to be the very same pages that I have managed to obtain from Colonel F.T. Birdwoods book on “The Sikh Regiment – In the Second World War“. And the book appears to acknowledge the fact in its Preface.
Below are the pages that I stumbled upon which provided the story of 4/11th Sikhs at El Alamein and Deir el Shein over the period 26th June to 1st July 1942.
El Alamein
26th June 1942
The run to El Alamein seems to have had a nightmare quality of frustrated good intentions. All the world was on its way back, and Daba station was crowded with personnel waiting for transport and eager to jump the Sikh’s train. Nothing could be done though. The train was already jammed full, and they had to be turned away. Farther on, along the line, at each of the frequent halts in the long, slow journey, parties of Bedouins, making their way back with everything they could carry, kept trying to board the train, and had to be kept at bay. However, all things have their endings, and in due time the Battalion arrived, and went into as dispersed a position, alongside the Gurkhas who were already there, as the nature of the ground would allow. The M.T. also rejoined after having been turned back on the road to Daba and the Battalion was again complete, except for its advance party under Morrison.
Meanwhile, there was no sign of Brigade Headquarters, which had gone on ahead. The Brigadier had gone down with pneumonia at Haifa, and Lieutenant Colonel Grey of the Gurkhas had taken over officiating command.
The night was quiet. Only one stick of bombs was dropped and this fell about three-quarters of a mile away, near the main road.
27th June 1942
At 9.30 a.m. on the 27th June, the commanding officer was sent for by Lieutenant Colonel May of the Essex, who was acting as brigadier in Lieutenant Colonel Grey’s absence, and told that the Brigade was to move to the Deir el Shein area, about 11 miles south of El Alamein. Here it was to prepare a brigade defensive position. Lieutenant Colonel Bampfield left with a reconnaissance party at 11 o’clock, and was shortly followed by Company Commanders. The troops were ferried down in the Battalion transport, the last party arriving at about 8.30 p.m. Lieutenant Colonel Grey got back the same night, as did the advance party which had a bewildering time in some respects. It had been up at Mersa Matruh, where, as Morrison said, orders for position after position had been given him. Each was cancelled almost as soon as issued, and he was eventually told to come back. Advancing German columns were already filtering in behind, and it was only by taking a circuitous route through the desert that he got through. The 2nd Battalion of the Sikh Regiment was at this time standing up manfully against attack in the covering position West of Mersa Matruh, with no thought of withdrawal or of enemy in their rear, and were not to fall back for another twenty-four hours yet.
Work was started immediately as the men arrived on the position at Deir el Shein, and continued without pause till 1 a.m. next morning. Wire had not come up, so work started with weapon pits. The ground was very rocky, but the Battalion was fortunate in being able to get, for a short time, some compressor drills from the 1st South African Division under whose command it had now come.
28th June 1942
Work on the defences re-started after a short rest, and went on all day on the 28th. By this time there was some wire, and a fair supply of mines. Knox, the son of Colonel E.F. Knox, D.S.O., who had commanded the Battalion – then the 36th Sikhs – in the second half of the First World war, went out on a reconnaissance about 20 miles ahead, and brought back most valuable information of what was going on. He had also been able to help one or two parties from other units which were out in the desert on the same mission. Meanwhile, in the Battalion there were serious problems to solve. One was water. The nearest water point was 40 miles away, but the Battalion had only one 220-gallon water-vehicle for the 800 odd men, Worse, the water point was being used by so many units that there was a queue of twenty or thirty vehicles waiting to fill up. This meant that the most it was reasonable to expect, was one journey a day. However, by loading up a 30-cwt. Lorry with pakhals, and sending that as well, it was just possible to ration the men at half-gallon a day.
The other worry was artillery support. The Field Regiment usually in support had parted company with the Brigade at Haifa. It had gone on ahead, and nothing had been heard of it since. It was assumed that the normal scale of artillery would sooner or later be allotted to the Brigade, but in the meantme something had to be done to ensure that when the guns did come, there would be no avoidable delay in getting them into action. At the moment the Battalion had two 2-pounder anti-tank guns only, which it had borrowed from a unit going down the line.
Enquiry confirmed that guns would be allotted in due course, but there was nothing to show how many. So, anti-tank gun positions were prepared on the Battalion front on the assumption that a full quota would be sent. It was an anxious time, as may be supposed, and not made easier by the lack of definite information, whether of the enemy troops or our own. The varying distance of our air bombing provided the only indication of the enemy’s progress.
Thanks to a full moon, it was possible to put in work at full pressure by night as well as by day, and the Battalion was averaging a little over twenty hours a day on digging, mining and wiring. Previous service in the desert was a tremendous asset for most of the men were able, with only the minimum of help, to lay the three different types of mines supplied. The minefield grew at a great pace, as also did the defensive wire, especially the Dannert concertina type. Both the Essex and the Gurkhas were helped by two or three non-commissioned officers the Battalion sent over to show them the way of it.
29th June 1942
Work thus continued full out on the defences on the 29th and 30th June, and resulted in a position of some strength. Apart from the one raid on the night of 29th/30th, there were no air attacks, and there were no casualties. The Royal Air Force, however, were much in evidence, and this heartened everyone. A regular service of bombers used to go over well escorted by fighters. The same number used to return with cheering regularity. It was these raids and the relative noise of the bomb-bursts, as heard in the position, that gave the Battalion its clue to the enemy’s progress, which by that test, was coming ominously close. Though they were not to know it, it was one of the key battles of the whole World War that was about to break over these devoted men, and it seems in a way rather odd that their feverish preparations should be justified by so very little in the way of official advance information.
30th June 1942
The 2nd Battalion passed through the position on the 30th June, after its break-out from Mersa Matruh, and no doubt, the Battalion welcomed the information it brought.
Not only the 2nd Battalion, but many others withdrew through the position during the day. By evening, all our forward troops were through, and it is time to give some fuller description of what were now the forward defensive localities. Ten miles or so to the North lay the 1st South African Division in a box astride the road and railway. The same distance to the South were the New Zealanders. To watch these two long gaps, there was in each a “Jock” Column of an infantry company and a few guns.
The 18th Brigade box, midway the South Africans and New Zealanders as we have seen, was slightly irregular in shape. The West face was held by the Sikhs, the sappers and medium machine guns. The Essex manned the faces on the North-East and North. The Gurkhas were on the South-East and South, with part of the famous Ruwaisat ridge in their area. Artillery requirements had at last been met, and the Brigade was better off in this respect than had been thought likely. But the guns had come up so late that there had been no time to get them properly dug in. In addition to ten field-guns, a number of 2-pounder and 6-pounder anti-tank guns had been sent, and a further reinforcement comprised seven Matilda tanks, and four medium machine guns of the Cheshire Regiment. (For initial dispositions refer to Sketch 2?)
Morale was high, and the Battalion records with appreciation the two visits paid it by Major General “Dan” Pienaar, Commander of the 1st South African Division, while constructing the position. The record pays him fine tribute in saying that “there can have been few more inspiring and understanding commanders,” and adds “in the short time that we knew him, we felt that we had made a real life-long friend.”
As the afternoon of the 30th June passed by, clouds of dust were seen moving eastwards, away to the North-West. Soon after, sounds of gunfire were heard. This was a German attack on the South African position astride the road. It was beaten off. Divisional Headquarters sent out a warning that attack was to be expected shortly. Nothing came of it, however, and the night was undisturbed.
1st July 1942
Early next morning, firing broke out again to the North. Soon after a guide cavalry patrol reported enemy movement, with infantry and tanks, towards the 18th Brigade box.
About 9 a.m., two shells fell in the southern part of the position, and for an hour thereafter, the enemy carried out systematic ranging with air-bursts and contact high explosive. There must have been observation posts well forward but none could be seen. It was discovered later that one was in a derelict truck which had been blown up in the minefield.
Between nine and ten there was a short interlude when the Germans sent in a message by two captured British officers under a flag of truce, to say that unless the position surrendered at once, it would be attacked. After getting some useful information from the unfortunate envoys, they were sent back with a flat refusal.
At 10 a.m., the enemy artillery opened on the Essex. They were heavily shelled, but escaped fairly lightly. From 11 a.m. the enemy extended his concentrations to include Brigade Headquarters, and began a general search of the area. The Sikh “B” echelon transport suffered rather heavily, and two ammunition trucks were hit and burnt out. While this shelling was going on, the Battalion telephone lines to companies were frequently cut, and the signallers had much difficulty in repairing them.
A small infantry formation, probably Italian, assisted by guns, now made a half-hearted attack on the South face, but was easily repulsed by the Gurkhas.
Shelling went on throughout the morning in various degrees of intensity, but progress was made nonetheless in digging in the 2-pounder anti-tank guns which had arrived the previous evening. If only there had been time enough to complete this properly, the artillery would have been saved many unnecessary casualties this day.
At 1 o’clock, under the cover of a dust-storm, which was further thickened by the dust thrown up by his own shelling, the enemy managed to clear a lane in the minefield on the North-East face of the perimeter between the Essex and the Gurkhas, and to pass through some infantry and machine-guns. The infantry were quickly ejected by mortar fire, but the machine-guns got into broken ground and established themselves.
Under cover of the machine-guns, a force of tanks now moved up and opened fire on everything that offered resistance. Our guns engaged them and knocked out two, but thanks to their lack of protection, were themselves soon put out of action.
It was difficult to see. Visibility was poor owing to the dust, and the artillery and machine-gun fire discouraged over-much personal exposure. There appeared, however, to be some thirty or forty tanks inside the box. Guns, or heavy tanks, sited some way to the North, seemed to be shelling the Essex and Brigade Headquarters trenches, while the tanks inside the box moved round the rear of the Essex. Most of these tanks moved in on the Essex, while two parties turned towards the Sikh “B” echelon and forward companies respectively.
The Essex were forced to surrender. The tanks then all moved in on the rear of the Sikh forward companies. The 2-pounders scored two hits before being silenced. In “A” Company area, tanks were engaged by a troop of 25-pounders close to Sikh Battalion Headquarters, and two were hit though not seriously. The supporting tanks opened fire, and with two salvos of one shot per tank, knocked out all four guns. This gallant action by our gunners lasted a bare minute and a half.
The tanks now closed in on the now defenceless Sikh companies. It was 5 o’clock and the battle was over, but there was no unnecessary surrender. Orders had been got through for the men to break away to the South if they could, and it was known that some had done so. Some of the transport had also been got away under orders from Brigade Headquarters. Lieutenant Colonel Bampfield decided that he would lie up in his battle headquarters slit-trench with his adjutant and the small Battalion Headquarters party. With luck they might remain unobserved, and be able to get away after dark.
Meanwhile, it was an exasperating position. With one anti-tank weapon much damage might have been done, for there were five German tanks 150 yards away, their crews drinking beer in the Sikh mess and sending off to the rear the other drinks and food they found there. One can sympathise with the onlookers, hot, thirsty and tired, grimed with sweat and dust, and unable to do anything but wait.
All this time, Battalion Headquarters was in touch with the Brigade, as the exchange operator, before he was captured, had plugged the Battalion through. This soon ended, however. Having had their fill of beer, the tanks moved ahead, passing each side of the Sikh slit-trench, and descended on Brigade Headquarters, supported by a very heavy artillery concentration. It was quickly over.
Time dragged on till 7.45 p.m., when the Battalion Headquarters party crept out of its slit-trench. It met a number of enemy vehicles while negotiating its way through the box, so divided up its fourteen members into four small groups. Three were led by Viceroy’s Commissioned Officers. In the fourth were the commanding officer, the adjutant (Trestrail) and one sepoy. There were sufficient compasses for each party, so after fixing the others’ bearings and issuing general instructions, the commanding officer wished them all good luck, and they parted company. As to the commanding officer’s little party, it got across the box without trouble beyond an occasional lie-up, as enemy vehicles crossed its path, moving into laager. Emerging from the box, a cross-country course was set, and after 2 miles, the party came across a Matilda tank, whose crew had been killed or captured without the tank being put out of action. This was just what the party wanted. The engine was running, so jumping in, they started off, and with Trestrail at the controls, though he had never been in a tank before, drove East across the desert at a steady 12 miles per hour. Ultimately an armoured formation was met, and the tank handed over. Trestrail was subsequently awarded the Military Cross.
